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Abstract—Allowing swift release cycles, Continuous Delivery
has become popular in application software development and
is starting to be applied in safety-critical domains such as the
automotive industry.
These domains require thorough analysis regarding safety
constraints, which can be achieved by formal verification and
the execution of safety tests resulting from a safety analysis on
the product. With continuous delivery in place, such tests need
to be executed with every build to ensure the latest software
still fulfills all safety requirements. Even more though, the safety
analysis has to be updated with every change to ensure the safety
test suite is still up-to-date.
We thus propose that a safety analysis should be treated
no differently from other deliverables such as source-code and
dependencies, formulate guidelines on how to achieve this and
advert areas where future research is needed.
Keywords-Software Safety; Software Quality; Embedded Soft-
ware;
I. INTRODUCTION
Agile software development practices have seen a major
boom in the past decades due to their ability in coping with
changing requirements and enabling short release cycles. This
has climaxed in today’s movements of DevOps and continuous
software engineering [1]. The latter aims to integrate every
aspect of software development, starting from sourcecode and
code analysis up to the delivery to productive environments, in
a Continuous Integration Pipeline. The ultimate goal is being
able to deliver the latest software to the customer at the push
of a button.
In corporate environments, other aspects have to be consid-
ered to the extent that even processes such as finance and HR
are sometimes examined from a continuous point of view [2].
Indeed, traditional corporate environments are adapting to
use agile software practices. With the fourth industrial revolu-
tion, many industrial branches that were traditionally alien to
computers are now facing a huge part of their products being
driven by software. A key example for this is the automotive
industry, which is challenged by the need to mass-produce
cyber-physical systems like no other industrial branch.
At present, efforts are being made to widely establish such a
pipeline for software integration in the industry [3], while one
manufacturer appears to be having such a pipeline in place
already. Recent accidents indicate, however, that safety is a
key feature to be taken into account more than ever with the
appearance of autonomous cars.
In fact, safety is arguably the most significant difference be-
tween cyber-physical systems and application software. Other
aspects, such as organizational corporate matters or service
availability are issues for application and mobile developers
as well.
A. Problem Statement
Since agile and continuous software development is tran-
scending to cyber-physical-systems, it is crucial to investigate
how safety requirements can be integrated in these concepts.
Nevertheless, while there are efforts to include safety engineer-
ing into agile software processes [4] [5], as of now (October
2016) there is no research on continuous software engineering
in combination with safety.
B. Hypothesis
We assume that, while formal verification on the design is
possible, it is always based on abstractions, an additional step
of safety testing on the concrete product is necessary.
Thus, our hypothesis is that an advanced continuous delivery
pipeline for safety-critical systems should include the safety
analysis as an artifact such as source code, dependencies or
tests and integrate test cases generated from the analysis into
every build. After all, the goal of a continuous delivery pipeline
is to deploy changed code into the production environment at
the push of a button. Thus, this is the only way to ensure that
all safety requirements are met.
C. Contributions
In this paper, we present our idea of Continuous Safety
Builds and what is required to implement them, outline the
Implications of such a process for programmers and team
members, propose Possible Tool Support along with Required
Research and finally highlight the Expected Benefits from an
integrated safety analysis. Related work is presented inline
where appropriate.
II. CONTINUOUS SAFETY BUILDS
The delivery pipeline in the automotive domain is quite
similar to its counterpart in application software development,
as depicted by an example in Figure 1. The major differences
are highlighted in dark grey:
Every component of the system is integrated on the target
hardware before a functional integration can take place. This is
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Fig. 1. Deployment Pipeline in the Automotive Industry
necessary, because modern complex functions are distributed
over several self-contained control units that need to communi-
cate to implement a function on the target system, the vehicle.
The second major difference are the safety tests that are
performed on the system, and this one sticks out. For all other
steps, there are well-established or experimental implementa-
tions that allow integration into a Continuous Delivery Suite
[3] [6] [7], but not for this one.
All steps in the pipeline use the result of the previous
step and combine them with one or more artifacts, mainly
automated test scripts. Other examples for artifacts may be
rules for static code analysis, hardware or third-party libraries.
All of them have in common, that they are developed parallel
to the source code, kept up-to-date on central infrastructure
(such as a CI system or source repository) and that an update
in any of these should cause a new build.
Based upon this notion, we formulate the following guide-
lines for Continuous Safety Builds:
1. Iterative Safety Analysis performed in parallel to
development
An up-to-date safety analysis is the first prerequisite for
contiunous safety testing. The analysis must be maintained
iteratively in line with the source code. This idea has been
introduced by Stahlhane et al. [5] with Safe Scrum, that
integrates safety analysis into Scrum sprints.
Analysis methods are often designed to be iterative with
respect to a changing system design or architecture [8] [9].
2. Safety Test execution and generation needs to be
automated
Automated execution of safety test cases is an obvious
requirement, but the test cases need to be automatically
generated from the analysis as well. Since the safety analysis
needs to be integrated into development, the necessary manual
work needs to be reduced to a minimum.
As depicted in Figure 2, the safety analyis has to be
transformed into concrete test cases that can be executed on
the software. This step is often done manually, but there
are approaches to automate this process fully, such as the
XSTAMPP platform [10] for STPA [11].
3. The Safety Analysis is an artifact like the source code
or test scripts
The Safety Analysis and its results should be treated in no
Fig. 2. Steps in Testing Software against Safety Analysis
way differently from other artifacts required for a build. Source
code, tests and configuration are often stored in the same
repository and dependencies are downloaded from servers that
keep them up-to-date. The same should be true for the safety
analysis, it needs to be stored in a central repository and in a
versioned manner.
If this holds, every change in the analysis can be tracked
and even trigger a build, which includes the generation of tests
from the analysis and the execution of updated tests against
the latest program version. This allows to apply the benefits
of continuous integration to the process of safety engineering
and shows inconsistencies immediately and automatically.
4. Safety Tests are included in every build
If the above is given, we can achieve our ultimate goal,
which is to check every latest piece of software for compliance
with the safety analysis. Thus, every build includes the safety
tests generated from the analysis.
This ensures that every build which might eventually be
delivered to production has passed an automatic safety check.
If this check was not passed, the build breaks and thus we
ensure that potentially unsafe software is not deployed even
in a CD scenario.
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. Seamless Integration of Safety and Software Engineering
To continuously integrate new software with the latest
results from the safety analysis, we need to ensure that we
can always test against an up-to-date safety analysis. Thus,
performing this analysis cannot be a separate process but must
be closely tied to the software development.
In Safe Scrum [5], every sprint in a scrum process is
expanded by a safety backlog in addition to the standard
sprint backlog, which includes the safety-relevant issues that
are changed in a single iteration.
For a continuous pipeline, however, this is still not suf-
ficient, because the work items from both backlogs might
be scheduled differently. This may lead to a part of safety-
relevant software being updated and commited, while the
safety analysis is not up-to-date (or vice versa) and thus
breaking the build.
Instead, the safety backlog needs to be integrated with the
functional sprint backlog. As depicted in Figure 3, each work
item is enriched with the safety requirements affected by it and
updating the safety analysis if necessary becomes a required
step before a commit to the mainline is possible.
Fig. 3. Adapted workflow for Work Items during a sprint
B. Every Developer becomes a safety engineer
Since we propose that tests generated from the safety
analysis are able to break the build, this requires an additional
check before commiting to the mainline and thus triggering a
build. At the very least, a developer has to be aware whether or
not his commit affects any of the safety-relevant components
and changes their behaviour. If it does, they need to ensure
that the safety analysis is updated together with the changed
source code in order to keep the build running. If the changes
are small, they might even be able to make the adjustments
themselves.
C. Dedicated Safety Engineers are supported by developers,
not replaced
Including developers in the process of safety engineering
does not mean that dedicated safety engineers become obso-
lete. The necessity to view safety from a system perspective
still holds, but developers will only view the aspects of the
module they are working on.
A safety engineer will thus be required to maintain and
expand the safety analysis for every release and keep it in line
with the requirements of the entire system. However, they will
be able to rely on the developers’ groundwork and aggregate
their changes to a reworked analysis.
IV. POSSIBLE TOOL SUPPORT
An implementation of the proposed process requires adap-
tations of currently available tools. In the following section,
we focus on Continuous Delivery suites, integrated developer
environments and tools supporting safety analysts and give
ideas how such tools could be expanded.
A. Integrated Developer Environments
Since we propose to involve developers in safety analysis
tasks and want to intertwine them with coding, it is straight-
forward to directly offer developers support in the tools they
use in their daily business.
Popular integrated developer environments (IDEs) such as
IntelliJ [12] or Visual Studio [13] are highly configurable
by plugins. Plugins for developers of safety-critical software
could create traceability between the source-code and the
safety analyis. Safety-critical parts of the software could be
marked, e.g. by annotations or models for traceability between
design and safety constraints [14] could be connected to the
implementation.
That way, the IDE could point the developer to the relevant
parts of the safety analysis and/or possibly affected safety
requirements, if a safety-relevant change was made to allow
him to make modifications with ease if necessary.
More concretely, in an example where STPA [11] is used,
the IDE could present a list of possibly affected hazards and
unsafe control actions for the developer to review and change
if necessary.
Updated safety artifacts could be commited to the repository
along with the source code without breaking a developer’s
workflow. This enables easy adoption of guideline 1 stated in
chapter II.
B. Safety Analysis Tools
Safety analysis methods typically feature tools that support
a safety engineer in doing so. Some of them, such as the
XSTAMPP platform [10] for STPA, already allow partial or
full generation from safety test cases when a certain step in
the analysis is reached.
As stated above, traceability to the source code is desirable.
Thus, such tools should be expanded to allow connection to
the system design and implementation.
Finally, tools should make sure that their deliverables are
stored in an open, machine-readable and non-binary format to
allow exchange between different tools and to track changes
in a version control system.
C. Continuous Delivery Suites
Continuous Delivery Suites such as GitLab [15] support
developers by integrating a source management system with a
customizable delivery pipeline. Each stage of the pipeline can
be configured to call external tools or execute scripts.
Safety Analysis tools could be called to generate safety tests
and the execution of tests could be triggered without much
adaptation this way. The safety test cases would be executed
along with all other test cases such that implementation of
guidelines 3 and 4 can be achieved.
For further ease of use and support of a dedicated safety
engineer, plugins for these tools could provide an user interface
to aggregate the safety-specific tests and their latest results
along with the recent changes in the safety analysis.
V. REQUIRED RESEARCH
The main goal of this paper is to provide an incentive for
researchers to look into related topics. At the present state of
research, an implementation of the proposed process seems
hard, because we do not know enough about some underlying
requirements.
The most basic requirement is the automatic generation of
safety test cases from well-defined deliverables of a safety
analyst. While there are approaches and tools to do this, the
full pipeline from a changed safety requirement to tests has
yet to be automated. The viability of an integration of safety
analysis into CI/CD suites also needs to be proven.
We have stated in the previous chapter that we would like
to improve traceability between safety constraints and related
source code, while we presented only very basic solutions.
It is likely that more sophisticated methods like data mining
algorithms or recommenders using historical data perform well
in deciding whether or not a change in some lines of code
has an effect on safety constraints. This should be further
investigated.
Finally, as of now we have only formulated a hypothesis
and proposed a process. The feasibility has yet to be shown in
empirical research, where appropriate tool support is available
and first experiences with Continuous Safety Builds are made.
VI. EXPECTED BENEFITS AND IMPACTS
With this paper, we have presented a new aspect of safety
engineering. Not only is our goal to integrate safety aspects
into agile software development, but into a continuous inte-
gration and delivery process. Further research in this area will
greatly help us as researchers to understand how producers of
safety-critical systems can set up and maintain fast delivery
cycles. At the same time, researchers can help such industries
to find solutions to challenges they encounter in doing so.
We have given an incentive to researchers of safety analysis
methods to put more emphasis on process automatization and
thus to reduce effort and ultimately cost of safety testing by
reasoning to intertwine safety engineering and development.
Finally, we aim to integrate safety into the field of con-
tinuous software engineering and thus to support continuous
deliveries of functionally tested, but also safe software.
VII. RISKS
Talking about benefits, risks of a newly proposed method
should also be adressed. A major issue is that a part of the
safety engineering is assigned to the developers, who might not
be appropriately educated to evaluate safety effects or make
light-hearted decisions based on a good guess. This can be
mitigated by rising the awareness of the importance of safety
aspects in developers, providing appropriate tools, training and
the support of a dedicated safety engineer.
Another obvious risk is that with the additional effort put
into safety analysis, the productivity of a project may decline
or the costs increase. Again, proper tool support can mitigate
this. It is also possible that increased cost can be amortized
by a lower liability for safety issues and/or savings due to the
automatization of a previously manual process, but this would
have to be shown in a larger study.
At last it is possible that managers and developers put too
much faith into the Continuous Safety Builds and a full safety
analysis is relinquished, which might lead to software being
delivered that was not sufficiently tested in regard to safety,
especially if above mentioned risks also arrive. This can only
be mitigated by the awareness that a full re-evaluation of the
safety analysis after a certain time interval cannot be replaced.
However, this risk holds even more if safety-critical software
is delivered without safety analysis and testing integrated into
the delivery pipeline.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Investigating the delivery pipelines of safety-critical soft-
ware, we have identified one major speciality: Safety testing,
which is normally supported by a manual analyis using meth-
ods such as STPA. With regard to the current transition seen
in consumer-oriented industries such as automotive software
towards continuous delivery, we formulated the hypothesis that
safety testing needs to be integrated into a continuous delivery
pipeline.
We proposed that in order to achieve this, the safety analysis
should be treated as an artifact no different from the source
code itself and tests should be automatically generated from it,
which can then be integrated in continuous builds. This implies
a seamless integration of safety engineering into the develop-
ment process. Every developer would have to iteratively update
the safety analysis with each work item to prevent breaking
safety builds, thus involving every team member in safety-
critical tasks.
Finally, we provided ideas for tool support in IDEs, Analysis
Tools and Continuous Delivery Suites and pointed towards
further research that is required to implement Continuous
Safety Builds.
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